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INTRODUCTION
There is no dispute that the district court concluded there were two distinct 
Terry stops here.  Without analysis, the State simply claims that any issue is 
foreclosed by this Court’s ruling in United States v. Foreman, 369 F.3d 776 (4th 
Cir. 2004), and attempts to distinguish other precedent based solely on the amount 
of time between stops.  Neither argument disposes of the issues in this case.  In 
Foreman, the Court did not analyze the issue of a subsequent stop in light of the 
nature of subsequent stops, but rather treated it as a fluid situation.  And 
distinctions based on time between stops are distinctions without a difference.  
Allowing law enforcement to repeatedly stop citizens without new, articulable 
suspicion amounts to unjust harassment regardless of the amount of time that 
lapses between stops, and the State cites no case that has ruled law enforcement 
may continue to stop citizens over and over again so long as they do not allow 
much time to lapse between stops.
In any event, even if the stops are merged into one, expanding the scope of 
the search violated William’s Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable 
seizure.  As a matter of law, the indicia relied on by the State do not raise 
reasonable suspicion of drug-related activity, and further detention to support a 
drug dog sweep was unwarranted.  The Court should vacate Williams’ conviction 
with directions to grant the motion to suppress.
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ARGUMENT
I. THERE WERE TWO DISTINCT DETENTIONS WITHOUT ANY 
ADDITIONAL SUSPICION JUSTIFYING THE SECOND 
DETENTION
The State does not dispute that there were two, independent stops in this 
case.  And it offers no analysis of the legal ramifications of stopping a citizen, 
letting him go, and then stopping him a second time. In the opening brief, 
Williams established that there is a line of authority in other circuits establishing 
that once a stop ends, there cannot be another stop without new, articulable basis 
for reasonable suspicion independent from the prior stop.  AOB 12-17 (discussing 
United States v. Peters, 10 F.3d 1517 (10th Cir. 1993), United States v. Garcia, 23 
F.3d 1331, 1333-34 (8th Cir. 1994), and United States v. Morin, 665 F.2d 765, 769 
(5th Cir. 1982).  The State did not directly address any of the analysis giving rise to 
this principle of search and seizure law.
The State relies exclusively on one distinguishable case that also does not 
directly analyze the second stop issue. The State argues that in United States v. 
Foreman, the Fourth Circuit rejected any analysis requiring new articulable 
suspicion to justify a new Terry stop following a stop that has concluded.  AB 8.  
But in that case, the officer gained a new fact supporting reasonable suspicion as 
he concluded the initial Terry stop. See Foreman, 369 F.3d at 779.  This Court 
noted “[the officer] returned [the defendant’s] driver’s license and registration, 
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after which [the defendant] thanked [the officer] for the warnings and gave him a 
sweaty handshake.”  Id. The Court relied on “heavy sweating,” a “physical sign[] 
of nervousness” to support its holding that reasonable suspicion existed. Id. at 784.
According to the facts relayed, the officer did not make physical contact 
with the defendant and observe the defendant’s sweaty palms until after the officer 
had issued the warning ticket.  Thus the officer gained additional information after 
issuing the ticket.  Here, on the other hand, the officers gained no new information
supporting reasonable suspicion before the first stop concluded—all of the State’s 
purported justifications for the second detention were known before the stop 
terminated.
Moreover, that decision did not consider precedent on the issue of sequential 
Terry stops because “[t]he district court did not cite any case law supporting the 
proposition that it was required to ignore all of the events which occurred before 
the time [the officer] ostensibly allowed [the defendant] to leave.  [And the Court 
was] aware of none.”  Instead, it treated the situation as fluid and looked to United 
States v. Williams, 271 F.3d 1262, 1271 (10th Cir. 2001).  But in that case, unlike 
here, the court never found there were two distinct stops and thus the relevant 
issues also were never addressed. If two stops had been found, the court would 
have been bound by Peters, 10 F.3d at 1522-23.
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The State did not advance any argument supporting an officer’s authority to 
initiate a Terry stop after terminating a previous stop without any new evidence.
Its only argument to distinguish prior case law is that, in the cases cited by 
Williams, the second stops were separated from the first by greater distances and
amounts of time.  But the State does not explain why an individual’s liberty 
interest is decreased immediately following a Terry stop or why it would replenish 
as the individual moves away from the stop. And not Peters, nor Garcia, nor 
Morin suggests that there was a gradually-replenishing liberty interest.  To the 
contrary, once an individual is free to go his or her liberty interest exists in full.  
The State’s offered distinctions are not legally significant.
II. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT ARTICULABLE SUSPICION TO 
EXPAND THE SCOPE OF EVEN A SINGLE DETENTION
“[W]hen an officer seeks to expand [an] investigation of a motorist beyond 
the reasons for the [initial stop], the officer must have a reasonable suspicion that 
the particular person seized in engaged in criminal activity.”  United States v. 
Brugal, 209 F.3d 353, 357 (4th Cir. 2007).  To support the expansion here, the 
State points to only four facts that, it argues, allow a routine traffic stop to 
transform into a drug investigation: (1) Williams was driving on Interstate 85 (2) 
early in the morning, (3) he provided a P.O. Box to the detaining officers rather 
than his home address, and (4) his vehicle’s rental agreement expired before he 
planned to leave his stated destination. AB 12-13. Collectively, these facts are 
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wholly consistent with lawful activity and do not eliminate a substantial portion of 
innocent travelers. The State does not address the cases Williams raised in his 
opening brief at 17-20.  Rather, it cites additional cases to argue individual facts
here are similar to facts that supported reasonable suspicion to expand the scope of 
other detentions.  AB 12-13.  The State’s cases are highly distinguishable, though, 
and the closest analogs—cited by Williams and not rebutted—plainly establish that 
there was not enough evidence to form reasonable suspicion to change the scope of 
the seizure.
In its first case, United States v. $50,720.00 in U.S. Currency, 589 F. Supp. 
2d 582 (E.D.N.C. 2008), in addition to travel on a drug corridor, the State founded 
its case on an “overwhelming odor of air freshener, the presence of two cellular 
telephones in the center console and [defendant’s] nervousness.”  Id. at 583.  These 
unique drug-specific facts went beyond merely traveling on an interstate, and go 
well beyond the facts in this case to amount to reasonable suspicion.  Likewise, in 
United States v. Newland, 246 F. App’x 180 (4th Cir. 2007), the State offered 
eleven factors leading to reasonable suspicion and especially focused on the fact 
that the officer could suspect defendants were making a common drug run by 
flying to Miami and driving to New York, the defendants apparently exited the 
highway to avoid a checkpoint, and defendants told an apparently false story about 
why they exited the highway.  Id. at 358 n.4.  Finally, the defendant in United 
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States v. Brugal, was “uncontrollably” nervous, told apparently false and/or 
inconsistent stories about his address and the address on his rental agreement, and 
he also provided an apparently fake ID. 209 F.3d at 182-83.
Each of the State’s cases contains one fact similar to a fact here, but each 
case also contains additional facts not present here that, taken as a whole, led to 
articulable reasonable suspicion.  The purely innocuous facts in this case, when 
taken as a whole, continue to be innocuous.  Because the facts do not lead to 
reasonable suspicion, it was impermissible to expand the scope of the traffic stop 
and turn it into a drug investigation.
III. NO “DE MINIMIS INTRUSION” STANDARD APPLIES HERE
The State argues that any intrusion here was “de minimis” and should be 
excused on that ground.  But the State does not and cannot address recent Fourth 
Circuit law—cited in Williams’ AOB at 22—that rejects any time-based de 
minimis exception to the rule that “where the traffic stop has concluded . . . any 
subsequent detention is impermissible without the presence of reasonable 
suspicion.”  United States v. Digiovanni, 650 F.3d 498, 508 (4th Cir. 2011) (a rule 
that grants an officer a specific amount of time “to do as he pleases [must be 
rejected because it] reduces the duration component to a bright-line rule and 
eliminates the scope inquiry altogether”). And in the context of second-stop 
analysis, of course there is no de minimis exception to initiating a Terry stop 
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without any reasonable suspicion to support it.  See United States v. Garcia, 23 
F.3d at 1334 (not discussing non-consensual duration of second detention, “six or 
seven” minutes, and holding stop unlawful). 
The State’s cited authority does not establish otherwise.  The State relies on 
dicta from a case predating this Circuits’ holding in Digiovanni that is highly 
distinguishable.  AB 16.  The State relies on United States v. Farrior, 535 F.3d 210 
(4th Cir. 2008), to say “[t]he Fourth Circuit has specifically held that detaining a 
defendant up to two minutes after the conclusion of a traffic stop to facilitate a 
drug-dog sniff is a de minimis intrusion of an individual’s liberty interest.” Id.  But 
in Farrior, there was no intrusion on the individual’s liberty interest because the 
individual had already consented to continued detention including to the search of 
his vehicle at the time a drug dog was deployed.  535 F.3d at 219.
Indeed, the State’s own authority recognizes there is no de minimis
exception to the scope limitation in this Court. The Court recognized in Foreman
that “in order to perform [a drug-dog] sniff, there must be a seizure of the vehicle 
and, therefore, the person, requiring either consent to be detained or reasonable 
suspicion.”  369 F.3d at 781. Thus Farrior cannot stand for the proposition 
asserted, and the Court’s authority rejects any bright-line rule that would allow an 
investigation of unlimited scope for an allegedly “de minimis” period of time. 
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant Charles Williams, Jr. respectfully 
requests that this Court vacate his conviction and sentence and reverse the district 
court’s order denying the motion to suppress.
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